During healthy times, credit growth often happens without proper provisioning. This is due to a managerial myopia that underestimates the risks underlying the expansive lending policy, leading to lower profitability in the following years. However, given the countercyclicality of credit standards, this effect shouldn't occur during harsh times. In this paper, we analyse the relationship between abnormal credit growth and bank profitability during a crisis period. In particular, we test the hypothesis that, during the crisis, abnormal credit growth improves bank profitability, given the need for higher or at least stable credit standards. We find support for this assumption using a sample of 101 large European banks during the recent crisis period. Results are robust to different robustness checks.
Introduction
The recent crisis has once more proved that irrational exuberance can lead to financial catastrophes.
The abnormal credit growth (i.e. the positive difference between the loans growth experimented by several aggressive banks and the corresponding whole market figures) observed before the collapse of Lehman Brothers can be described as a typical example of Minsky (1992) financial instability framework. Financial units, observing neighbour catching "big preys", were switching to aggressive behaviours -from hedging units to speculative units, and from speculative units to Ponzi units, using Minsky words. But famine arrived, and the financial system collapsed. The overestimation of the persistence of asset growth and the underestimation of the risks linked to fast credit expansion were the springs that created and enlarged the bubble: the growing spread between risk appetite and risk consciousness led to a financial meltdown.
Literature has observed that during wealthy times, abnormal credit expansion typically leads to higher loan loss provisions in the following years (Foos, Norden and Weber, 2010) ; this produces adverse effect on bank profitability (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz, 2016) . The reasons of the negative outcome rely on a managerial myopia that reflects short-termism, adverse incentives and underestimation of risks. But managers can learn from experience, and their behaviour is likely to be different during famine: in harsh times, only skilled and well equipped people will take the risk to hunt big preys. Under these assumptions, during a severe period of financial distress, abnormal credit growth should be seen as a signal of health and not as a pathological strategy undertaken by a bank. Bankers that are expanding credit above the average (or reducing it less than the average) during a crisis period should be conscious of the risks involved in their choices and have a strong incentive to act prudently, also in provisioning for credit losses. This different approach during market booms and crashes is coherent with the countercyclical shape of credit standards introduced by Ruckes (2004) : the final outcome of this process is that abnormal credit growth during the crisis should have a beneficial effect on bank profitability over time.
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The aim of this paper is to test the relationship between abnormal credit growth and bank profitability during a crisis period. In particular, we test the hypothesis that, during a crisis period, abnormal credit growth improves bank profitability, given the need for higher or at least stable credit standards. To do this, we use a wide set of bank-level data for a sample of 101 European banks during the period 2006-2014. In particular, we examine the effect of abnormal credit growth on bank profitability, controlling for lending quality through the use of coincident and lagged loan loss provisions. Abnormal credit growth, being built as a "more-than-average" measure of variation, has a straightforward interpretation and allows us to explore the phenomenon without introducing arbitrary thresholds in our econometric analysis. Moreover, it can be used both in healthy (indicating a fast credit growth) and in distressed periods (measuring smaller contractions in credit supply by the banking system). In effect, positive figures of abnormal loan growth indicate an expansion in banks' credit market share, independently by the economic cycle conditions. Existing literature (above all, Foos, Norden and Weber, 2010 and Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz, 2016 ) focuses on the role of abnormal lending expansion during good times in explaining higher loan loss provisions (and a lower profitability levels) in the following years; in this sense, fast credit growth can be seen as an explanatory variable of crisis periods at micro and macro level. On the contrary, our work analyses the effects of fast credit growth on bank profitability during the crisis, and in this we contribute to literature. Empirical findings confirm the hypothesis under investigation and provide several policy implications for bankers and regulators. Among them, we demonstrate that during crisis periods the traditional "curse of the winner" linked to credit expansion is not likely to happen. In this sense, aggressive strategies -when coupled with adequate provisioning and credit standards -can improve bank profitability: hence, the attention should be switched from the raw pace of credit growth to the risk attitude of the banking system. This is true both from a managerial and macro-prudential point of view. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review; Section 3 describes the hypothesis and the econometric model ! 4! used to test it; Section 4 includes empirical estimations. In Section 5, we draw conclusions and policy implications.
Literature review
Since the seminal works of Short (1979) and Bourke (1989) The recent crisis period has given evidence to the close relationship between micro and macroeconomic factors in determining bank profitability and overall system stability. In particular, the crisis has proven that a wide number of microeconomic imbalances can result in a severe macroeconomic downturn. The (individual) fast credit growth undertaken by part of the banks has been the trigger for the following crisis period; more relaxed credit standards have generated huge amounts of loan losses in the following years, giving birth to one of the most severe recession ever seen in modern times.
A recent stream of literature has studied the link between loans growth and credit quality. The underlying assumption is that fast credit growth is associated with a relaxation of lending standards, leading to a soaring level of loan loss provisions (LLP) in the following years. Studying more than 16,000 banks during the period 1997 -2007 , Foos, Norden and Weber (2010 find that an abnormal credit growth generates greater LLP. This relationship traditionally occur with a lag of some years.
A recent paper by Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz (2016) generalize this analysis to the link between loans growth and bank profitability; findings indicate that fast credit growth is usually coupled by low contemporaneous loan loss provisioning, leading to high profitability in the (coincident) year of fast growth, but weaker performances in the following times. This myopic ! 5! approach undertaken by the banking system can be explained by the underestimation of the risks related with a fast expansion of lending. The expected (short term) growth in interest income hides a (medium term) deterioration effect in credit quality, but the managers are paying more attention to the immediate positive results.
This behaviour is less likely to occur during a crisis period: in harsh times, the pressure on bank profitability pushes the managers to employ flight to quality strategies and a wiser lending policy (Ruckes 2004) . In this context, a fast credit growth should better indicate a sound financial position of the bank that allows an expansive strategy to improve its market share. Briefly said, the crisis tends to reduce the moral hazard in credit management. The outcome of a fast credit growth, under these assumptions, should be an increase in bank profitability.
Besides lending management, other bank-specific features affect profitability; in particular, efficiency and leverage are usually found in empirical works in literature.
The most important measure of efficiency (or, in this case, inefficiency) is the 'cost-to-income' ratio: wide empirical evidence supports a negative relationship between this indicator and bank profits. 
Hypothesis and model
To test the hypothesis of a positive relationship between abnormal loan growth and bank profitability during the crisis, we employ two sets of explanatory variables (firm-specific We consider two dependent variables to explain bank profitability: ROAA and ROAE. ROAA explains bank capacity to generate profits from the managed assets and it is considered the key ratio to evaluate bank profitability (Golin 2013) ; ROAE reveals how much profit a company generates with the shareholders' capital.
Following the empirical literature on the determinants of bank profitability presented in the previous section, we consider different bank-specific characteristics as explanatory variables.
Since aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between abnormal loans growth (ALG) and bank profitability, the former variable is the most crucial for our econometric estimations.
Abnormal loan growth indicates the positive difference between the annual growth rate of gross ! 8! loans of a bank and the corresponding average growth rate of gross loans in the country in which the bank is located (Foos, Norden and Weber 2010) . By construction, the variable assumes positive sign when bank specific percentage change in loans is greater than market average one: this is true both when a bank is increasing loans more that than the market and when the bank is reducing credit to customers less than competitors. Being a way to expand business opportunities, abnormal loans growth may promote bank profitability: this naturally occurs when growth is not coupled with lower quality standards. This latter factor is an element of concern widely recognised in the existing literature and usually indicated as the main reason for the negative relationship between ALG and bank profitability (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz 2016) . Since loans typically produce effects on banks income statement over time -and adverse effects are usually observed with a lag of some years (Foos, Norden and Weber 2010), we introduce both coincident and lagged version of this variable. Coherently with the preceding notes, we expect a positive sign for the coefficient associated to abnormal loan growth during the time span under examination.
The hypothesis that we want to test states that during crisis credit growth occurs without relaxing credit standards. We cannot directly observe this latter item, but we can extract a proxy from income statements, using loan loss provisions (LLP) figures. Loan loss provisions to average gross loans are part of the overall cost of lending activity. In this sense they have a negative impact on bank profitability (Chronopoulos et al. 2015) as measured by ROAA and ROAE. In our econometric estimation we use LLP to indirectly control the credit risk assessment process. If a bank is wisely measuring the risk of its credit portfolio, its provisioning should be properly set in order to prevent future losses; in an econometric test this means a negative sign of the coefficient associated to coincident LLP, while lagged versions of the variable should be associated to nonsignificant coefficients.
We include Total assets in our set of explanatory variable to account for bank size. An increase in the bank dimension brings two opposite effects: on the one hand, the opportunity to exploit scale and scope economies (Pasiouras and Kosmidou 2007) and, on the other hand, the costs associated ! 9! with bureaucracy and complexity (Stiroh and Rumble 2006) . Hence, the expected sign is undetermined.
The ratio of Equity to Total Assets is introduced as a measure of capital strength. High ratios indicate a low level of leverage, and therefore low riskiness: consequently, on the basis of the conventional risk-return hypothesis, they are associated with lower expected profitability. However, as noted in Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014) , lower levels of risk strengthen bank soundness and reduce funding costs, with a positive effect on its profitability. Given these opposite effects, the impact of bank's capitalization on profitability is not theoretically determinate.
Since we explore loans dynamics, we use the Net Loans to Total Assets ratio to measures the Turning to the macroeconomic dimension, our set of external indicators includes different countryspecific variables that are likely to influence the bank profitability. Undoubtedly, the soundness of the surrounding economic environment, the strength of competition in the banking sector, and other external factor impact on the costs and revenues of a bank, on the quality of its assets and hence on its financial stability. Considering more in detail the competitive dimension of the banking system, the traditional theories about the effect of competition on firm profitability have been applied to the banking sector leading to different approaches. Among them we find the Structure -Conduct -Performance hypotheses, the Efficient -Structure hypotheses, the Expense Preference hypotheses, the Galbraith -Caves Risk-avoidance hypotheses (for a review of literature about these topics see Rasiah 2010) . Usually, a higher degree of market concentration is associated with the opportunity of extracting oligopolistic rents through collusive behaviours. However, a concentrated banking market can be the result of a fierce competition between intermediaries: this could lead to compress their profit margins, for example in the traditional activity of borrowing and lending, reducing bank ! 11! profitability. As a result, the expected effect of concentration on profitability is uncertain. It is also worth observing that is difficult to find an uncontroversial measure of market concentration;
previous studies have used a wide set of indicators (i.e. the market share of the first 3-5 players, the Lerner Index, etc.). We use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of total assets for each country, as it is the measure of market concentration commonly used by the European Central Bank.
In order to explore the link between abnormal credit growth and bank profitability, we run the following dynamic panel model (dynamic specification is in line with the results of Goddard et al.
2011)
:
where Π it is the profitability of bank i at time t and ε it the disturbance term. Our explanatory variables are grouped into bank-specific (! !" ! )!and macroeconomic ones (! !" ! ); moreover, a dummy (! ! ) captures the effects of the sovereign debt crisis (years 2011-2014). We include coincident and lagged ALG and LLP (up to 2 lags) in order to control for the effect of credit growth and credit quality on profitability over time. with the specific features of French cooperative banking system that is characterized by bigger players than Italian and German mutual banks. Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the econometric estimation. Table 3 give evidence to the presence of sporadic borderline observations. This occurs in particular for abnormal loans growth and cost income.
Maximum and minimum values reported in
However, being these figures referred to different banks in different years and countries, they do not identify specific outliers.
(INSERT TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 HERE)
To properly estimate the dynamic panel model, as dynamic specification gives rise to some econometric problems of consistency, we rely on instrumental variable techniques such as the appropriate GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998) . In particular, we use the GMM-DIF estimator as, under the assumption of no serial correlation of the error term in levels, it is possible to use values in level of the dependent variable and endogenous regressors lagged two periods back and more as instruments 1 .
Estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and 5 ; GMM-DIF model results are compared with a
1 GMM-DIF estimator is preferred to GMM-SYS, another well-known and used estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998) , when the magnitude of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is not close to 1 (i.e., there is not a significant autoregressive process) as in the case of our dependent variables ROAA and ROAE. ! ! 13! fixed-effect specification. Moreover, since autoregressive process is weak for our dependent variables, we include the results of a fixed-effect static specification.
(INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE)
Given the (expected) high correlation between ROAA and ROAE (equal to 0.87 over the whole sample), regressions show similar results.
Abnormal loans growth has a positive sign over all our regressions: this confirms our hypothesis of a direct link between ALG and profitability during crisis period. In effect, the attitude to increase credit is usually considered a good health indicator of a bank and one of the most crucial driver to boost profitability; this is particularly true for banks belonging to the traditional "commercial banking" paradigm, where borrowing and lending money is the core business of each player.
Results indicates positive coefficients both in coincident and lagged versions of ALG: this mean that the positive effects of lending growth are exerted across the following years on bank profits and they are not just a temporary accounting outcome.
As expected, coincident loan loss provisions are associated with negative and significant coefficients. Naturally this is not surprising, since LLP is a traditional source of costs in bank income statement. However, coherently with our research hypothesis, lagged LLPs do not show statistically significant coefficients; this result suggests that a wise provisioning prevents banks profitability from concerns in the following years 2 . Econometric outcomes draw a picture in which loan growth happens in a prudent framework, where provisions are adequate and there is not a rollover of credit risks across the years: this perfectly fits the assumptions of our test.
With regard to the other explanatory variables, total assets and net loans to total assets are associated with negative (when significant) coefficients: this result can be explained by the pressure experimented during the crisis by several big banks more exposed to the lending sector. At the same
time, specialization in lending can exert a twofold effect on bank profitability in our dataset. On the hand it can improve it through a better knowledge in credit sector; on the other a greater exposure in granting money to customer is an element of strong concern during a severe credit crisis like the recent one. Results suggests that between the two elements, the latter has dominated in econometric estimations.
We find weakly significant coefficients on equity to total assets in fixed-effect ROAA regressions:
greater levels of regulatory capital seem to have only played a limited role in promoting profitability.
Cost Income ratio, as expected, presents steadily negative and significant sign. Banks effort to improve their efficiency has granted a higher level of profitability during the whole period under investigation. The high statistical significance of all the coefficients across different econometric estimations suggests the relevance of cost income in explaining bank profitability during a crisis period, when traditional revenue margins tend to decrease; hence, it is not surprising that during recent years regulators have continuously suggested the banking system to reduce its level of operating costs.
With regard to macroeconomic conditions, we find positive and (weakly) significant coefficients for GDP growth and HICP in ROAA regression. Considering the concentration issue, HHI shows a negative and significant coefficient in the regressions. Estimation results appear coherent with a market framework in which concentration leads to tougher competition between banks, reducing profitability. This is likely to be true particularly in troubled periods, when rivalries are fiercer.
Robustness checks
To run robustness checks, we used different sample selection strategies and time-span specification.
First of all (see Tables 6 and 7) , our model focuses on the crisis period; however, we use data coming from pre-crisis period in lagged variables, at least for years 2008 and 2009. Then, we run ! 15! the model using only data for the period 2010-2014 (in this specification, also lagged variables are measured during the crisis). Main results are unaffected by this test.
(INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE)
Secondly (see Tables 8 and 9 ), since French banks dominate our panel numerically, we run the three regressions excluding these latter intermediaries. Moreover, we test other sample selections excluding some borderline observations (e.g. banks with extreme low values in ROAE and Loans to total assets). Once more, main results are unaffected.
(INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 HERE)
Finally (see Tables 10 and 11) , the use of ALG may produce some (apparent) misunderstandings;
the most important one is that we can obtain a positive ALG from a negative loan growth rate.
During the crisis, a widespread credit rationing has been observed in the countries under examination. If a bank is reducing the amount of credit granted to the economy less than the banking sector (on average) in the same country, we obtain a positive ALG. It should be argued that this lower reduction, from a competitive point of view, can be seen as an expanding strategy;
anyway, we re-estimate our model using only banks that experimented a positive loan growth in the period under analysis. Results for ROAA remain still unchanged, while in ROAE we experiment a reduction in the significance of the coefficients; it must be noted that these robustness checks greatly reduces the number of observations and this lead to several drawbacks in estimations.
(INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11 HERE)
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Conclusions and policy implications
In recent years, lending policies have been taken to the forefront of academic and political debate, due to the primary role that credit expansion has played in the crisis. Our results show that expansive credit strategies can improve bank profitability when combined with wise provisioning and a stable quality in lending standards. The hypothesis about the role of the crisis in reducing agency problems and moral hazard issues finds support in the empirical results previously shown and discussed. This outcome seems to contrast a widespread literature about the negative relationship between loans growth and bank profitability, given the attitude of the banking system to relax lending access rules and underestimate the loan impairment charges during sound periods.
However, our empirical results tends to complement this same literature; it emerges that the main issue is not credit growth per se, but the perverse combination between high credit growth, low provisioning and looser lending standards.
These outcomes have relevant policy implications. Firstly, we demonstrate that ALG can be consistent with an increment in bank profitability; the "curse of the winner" is an outcome due to underestimation of risks and managerial myopia that can be eliminated through a wise provisioning and credit risks assessment. From a regulatory point of view, results indicate that the correct balance between growth and provisioning should be the key element to be monitored; this has implications also on the ongoing debate on the revision of internal rating based models. Moreover, the ability to gain market shares in credit market during a crisis signals the bank health and hence is to be considered a positive element when evaluating the perspectives of profit generation.
Overall, the recent crisis has played a dual role in the last years. Undoubtedly it has led to a dramatic fall in bank profitability, leading to a severe economic downturn. However, under a different perspective, it has also renewed the importance of the traditional drivers of bank management after a period dominated by more speculative business strategies. In this sense coming back to the basics of bank management -improving efficiency, credit policies and finding a sound ! 17! competitive positioning -will be fundamental to generate a proper profitability in order to meet capital requirements and to be attractive on capital markets. 0.19*** (0.048) -0.24*** (0.041) ALG i, t 0.01*** (0.003) 0.01** (0.002) 0.00** (0.002) ALG i, t-1 0.01*** (0.002) 0.00** (0.002) 0.00** (0.002) ALG i, t-2 0.00** (0.002) 0.00* (0.002) 0.00 (0.001) LLP i, t -0.18** (0.074) -0.17** (0.073) -0.23*** (0.025) LLP i, t-1 -0.01 (0.017) 0.00 (0 
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